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Can we benefit in non-identity cases?
by Charlotte Unruh
ing them better off than they would otherwise have been. If this 
assumption is true, then the Unlucky People can’t complain about 
our choice based on our obligations to benefit. After all, they 
would never have existed, and therefore not been benefited, had 
we chosen the beneficial policy. In other words, it is not the case 
that obligations to benefit entail that we ought to choose the ben-
eficial policy. Let’s call this the positive non-identity argument.
The conclusion of the positive non-identity argument is – while 
less devastating than that of Risky Policy (at least it doesn’t end 
in a catastrophe!) – still disturbing. If you share its premises, then 
you end up with the view that we cannot benefit people in those 
cases or prevent harm to them. This challenges the view that we 
have a moral reason, if not an obligation, to choose the beneficial 
policy.
It seems to me that we should choose the beneficial policy. It also 
seems clear to me that we should do so because this would ben-
efit future people. The most natural explanation of intuitions in 
Risky Policy is that choosing the risky policy risks harm to future 
people. This has motivated harm-based solutions to the non-iden-
tity problem (e.g. Shiffrin 1999; Harman 2009; Gardner 2015).2 
Similarly, the most natural explanation of intuitions in Beneficial 
Policy is that choosing the beneficial policy benefits future people.
Therefore, I believe that the most plausible solution to the 
non-identity problem will not only rely on an understanding 
of harming that explains how, and to what extent, the people in 
Risky Policy are harmed. It will also explain how, and to what 
extent, we fail to benefit the people in Beneficial Policy.
In Risky Policy and Beneficial Policy, our decision indirectly in-
fluences the identity of future populations. In contrast, in some 
cases in reproductive ethics, decisions such as whether to implant 
one embryo rather than another directly and necessarily influence 
who will be born. As Jörg Tremmel has argued,3 and as Jasmine 
Nedevska, and Michael Rose argue in their contributions to this 
volume, there might be reason to doubt that the scope of the 
non-identity problem extends beyond reproduction cases. It is 
therefore worth pointing out that my argument applies to repro-
duction cases as well. To illustrate, consider Parfit’s case of the 
14-year-old girl who decides to get pregnant, despite knowing 
that because of her age, she will not be able to give her child a 
good start in life.4 A variant of this case is:
(18-year-old woman) A young woman contemplates whether 
to have a child now or later. On a whim, she decides to have a 
child now. She gives her child an adequate start in life. If she 
had waited, she would have had a different child, to whom she 
would have given a much better start in life.
It seems to me that the woman has at least a good reason to post-
pone conception. The most natural explanation is that doing so 
would benefit her future child.
I conclude that if we accept any version of the non-identity prob-
any people believe that we have a moral reason to 
benefit others. However, this reason is common-
ly thought to be weaker than the reason against 
harming others. This might explain why relatively little attention 
has been paid to the morality of benefiting in non-identity cases.
My aim is to convince you, in the next few paragraphs, that this 
is a decisive oversight. The non-identity problem arises in cases of 
harming and in cases of benefiting alike. It is therefore broader in 
scope than is often acknowledged. The most promising solutions 
of the non-identity problem are harm-based, but such solutions 
will need to provide suitable accounts of both harming and ben-
efiting.
In his classic “Risky Policy” case, Derek Parfit describes a com-
munity that has to decide between two policies.1 They choose the 
risky policy, which is cheaper in the short term, but likely to result 
in a future catastrophe. The choice of policy influences who will 
be born. Therefore, the victims of the future catastrophe would 
not have lived, and thus not be better off, had the other policy 
been chosen. The non-identity problem is the challenge to explain 
the intuitive verdict that we should nonetheless not choose the 
risky policy.
Now, consider the following variant:
(Beneficial Policy) As a community, we can choose between 
two policies. Both policies do not significantly impact the 
wellbeing of the next few generations, but one policy will pro-
vide certain benefits for those living in the further future. If 
we choose the Beneficial Policy, the standard of living would 
be a tiny bit lower over the next few centuries. We do not 
choose this policy. As a result, the people in the further future 
do not have access to the benefits.
Assume (in analogy to Risky Policy) that which policy we choose 
affects who will live in the future. If we choose the beneficial pol-
icy, then one set of people will exist. Let’s call them the Lucky 
People. If we do not choose the beneficial policy, then a different 
set of people will exist. Let’s call them the Unlucky People.
This assumption is plausible, or at any rate, it is just as plausible as 
it is in Risky Policy. Some of our policies potentially affect those 
living in the far future. Investments in technology development 
and medical research, usage of scarce resources, or disarmament 
policies might have significant long-term effects without (neces-
sarily) making much of a difference for those who currently exist. 
One might object that if a choice is changing people’s lives sig-
nificantly (and is therefore identity-affecting), it is likely to be 
costly, as people have to adapt to new ways of life. However, this 
need not be the case. It is at least conceivable that this might be 
outweighed, e.g. by people’s satisfaction from seeing sustainable 
policies put in place, or small benefits that show already earlier.
Here is another plausible assumption: we benefit people by mak-
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lem, we should also accept its positive counterpart: we are chal-
lenged to explain why we ought to behave in ways that prevent 
harm to, or benefit, people, even though doing so does not make 
their lives go any better. 
Charlotte Unruh writes her PhD thesis in philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Southampton, UK.
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